In re WILFORD WRIGHT et al., on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Habeas Corpus -Grounds -Evidence.-A writ of habeas corpus is not available to attack a flnal judgment on the ground that the conviction rests on evidence obtained by an illegal ~rch and seizure incident to an unlawful arrest. been imposed on defendants who had been convicted of kidnaping one victim for the purpose of robbery, and for first degree robbery of that victim, and for first degree robbery of a second victim, the sentence for the first robbery, being less severe than that for the kidnaping, should be eliminated; however, the robbery of the second victim, although committed in the course of the same criminal enterprise, was an offense against a person other than the victim of the kidnaping and therefore was a proper subject of a separate sentence.
PROCEEDINGS in habeas corpus to secure release from custody after sentences imposed for one kidnaping and two robbery convictions. Sentences for one robbery conviction set aside; order to show cause discharged and writ denied. Logan (1966) 244 Cal. App.2d 795, 798 [53 Cal.Rptr. 549] .) The argument that violation of the proscription against double punishment may not prejudice a defendant in a particular case, however, is not a convincing ground for overruling scores of cases holding that the dual sentences should not be allowed to stand.
[3] Section 654 forbids multiple punishment by imposition of the proscribed multiple sentences, but not multiple convictions. (People v. Tideman (1962) The Attorney General further states that our decisions are in conflict as to the proper procedure to be followed by appellate courts to correct multiple sentences violative of section 654. He urges that if we refuse to uphold the sentences here on either ground advanced by him (that concurrent sentences do not inflict double punishment or that they are not prejudicial) then we should suspend execution of one sentence by a procedure similar to that of the sentencing court approved in People v. Niles, supra, 227 Cal. App.2d 749, [755] [756] [198 P. 4Defendant in the Niles ease was eonvicted of burglary and of a felonious assault committed as an incident to his sole objective of burglary. The trial judge sentenced him on both counts but stayed execution on the assault count pending any appeal and during service of any term fixed by the Adult Authority on the burglary count, the stay to become permanent at the completion of service of any sentence for the burglary. This procedure was upheld by the appellate eourt. (Accord, People v. R08enfield (1966) App.2d 928, [934] [935] .) PeopZe v. Hernandez (1966) 242 CaI.App.2d 351, 358-359, 361-362 [51 Cal. Rptr. 385] , questioned the propriety of the procedure in Niles on the ground that the express legislative recognition of the trial court's power to stay execution in certain situations justifies the inference that the Legislature meant to limit that power to those situations. (In re Collins (1908) 8 Cal.App. 367, 369 [97 P. 188] .) The Hernandez opinion (242 Cal. fn. 1) suggests that the trial court can stay execution of sentenee in only two situations, i.e., when probation is granted (Pen. Code, § § 1203.1, 1203a) and when an appeal is taken (Pen. Code, § § 1243, 1467). Suspension of execution of sentence is also authorized by statute, however, in the special statutory proceedings for those convicted of crime who may be mentally disordered sex offenders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § § 5500.5, 5501, subd. (a).)
It is true that a number of California cases declare that "A court has no power to suspend a sentence except as an incident to granting probation." (Oster v. Municipal Court (1955) Judgments, § 345.) Those eases, however, were concerned with suspension of sentence as an act of lenience. The essence of their reasoning is that since the Legislature has prescribed the method for exercise of such lenience in the probation statutes, the trial court cannot suspend sentence as an act of grace under some inherent or common law power (see E:c parte Slattery (1912) 425] ) and that in a probation situation the court's order suspending its sentence must either be interpreted as a grant of probation, however in· formal, or if the suspension cannot be so interpreted (as where the court denies probation and nevertheless purports to suspend sentence) then the order of suspension is void and the sentence is valid. (Oster v. MunioipalOourt, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 134, 139.) Although the Legislature has not expressly provided for a stay of exe· cution of sentence in the Niles situation, the power to proceed as the trial court did in that case is within the fair import of section 654. As the appellate court there explained (221 Cal.App.2d at p. 156) that procedure reasonably reconciles the policies involved in applying section 654 to protect the rights of both the state and the defendant •
